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FEDERAL AND STATE SECURITIES CLAIMS: LITIGATION OR
ARBITRATION?-Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct.
1238 (1985).
An investor-broker agreement typically contains an arbitration clause. I
Thus, as a practical matter, an investor must agree to arbitrate future
disputes as a condition of doing business with a broker-dealer. 2 An arbitration clause is not enforceable for claims arising under the Federal Securities
Act of 19333 or the Federal Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 4 State
securities law claims, however, are subject to arbitration under the Federal
Arbitration Act. 5
The federal courts of appeals were divided on the best method to resolve
the conflict between the federal securities acts and the Federal Arbitration
Act which occurred when nonarbitrable federal securities claims were
joined with arbitrable state securities claims. Some circuits separated the
claims and permitted litigation of the federal claims and arbitration of the
state claims; 6 others permitted litigation of both federal claims and pendent
7
state claims.
In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,8 the Supreme Court held that
arbitrable state claims pendent to federal securities claims must be arbitrated upon the request of either party. 9 The Court stressed that the Act
mandates that courts direct the parties to arbitrate issues when a valid
arbitration contract has been signed. In a concurring opinion, Justice White
raised the issue of whether federal securities laws prohibit arbitration of
section 10(b) claims under the Exchange Act. 10
1. Arbitration has long been a common method of settling disputes on securities exchanges.
Comment, Arbitration of Investor-BrokerDisputes, 65 CALnF. L. REV. 121-22 (1977). See generally
Hoellering, Arbitrabilityof Disputes, 41 Bus. LAW 125 (1985).
2. Katsoris, Arbitrationof a Public SecuritiesDispute, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 279, 292 (1984).
3. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77(a)-77(aa) (1982)) [hereinafter referred to as Securities Act].
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-78(kk) (1982)) [hereinafter referred to as Exchange Act].
5. Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982))
[hereinafter referred to as the Arbitration Act or the Act].
6. See, e.g., Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983).
7. See, e.g., Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct.
1238 (1985); Raiford v. Buslease, Inc., 745 F.2d 1419 (11th Cir. 1984); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co.,
637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981).
8. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
9. Id. at 1244.
10. Id. (White, J., concurring) (referring to 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-77(aa) (1982)). Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act prohibits misrepresentations or material omissions in the purchase or sale of a
security. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5 was promulgated under section 10(b).
Throughout this Note, references to section 10(b) will include issues raised under Rule lOb-5.
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This Note analyzes Byrd in light of the dilemma that occurs when federal
and state claims arise in the same action. The Note concludes that, although

Byrd may be a step in the right direction, the current state of the law is still
not satisfactory. Because arbitration offers several advantages to the investor, 11 this Note argues that both federal and state securities claims should be
arbitrated. The Note suggests that either Congress change the law to allow
arbitration of the federal claims, as Justice White proposed, or the Court
allow arbitration of section 10(b) claims, or even of claims brought under
the Securities Act.

To ensure that investors are properly protected in the arbitration tribunal,
however, substantial changes must be made in the arbitration process.

Therefore, this Note proposes that Congress, the courts, and the industry
itself act to make arbitration more fair to investors. Until the Court is
convinced that arbitration proceedings provide adequate investor protection, it should continue to require litigation of federal claims in federal

court.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

The FederalArbitrationAct

Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act in 192512 to cure judicial
hostility toward arbitration agreements. 13 Prior to the Act's passage, many

courts would not enforce the terms of arbitration agreements.

14

The Act

requires arbitration under predispute agreements, 15 but applies only to
contracts involving interstate commerce. 16 Since securities violations
II. The primary benefits of arbitration include speed, efficiency, and relatively low cost. Arbitration has been estimated to cost less than one-third of what litigation costs, and most arbitration
proceedings are completed within six months. Meyerowitz, The ArbitrationAlternative, 71 A.B.A. J.
78, 80 (1985). Another advantage of arbitration is the ability ofparties to choose their own "judge." See
Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense. 2
CARDOZO L. REV. 481, 486 (1981).
12. Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 401,43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14(1982)).
13. See S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1924).
14. See, e.g., Cocalis v. Nazilides, 308 Ill. 152, 139 N.E. 95 (1923) (predispute agreement void as
depriving parties of right of access to the courts as provided in the Constitution).
15. This Note is limited to predispute arbitration agreements. An investor and broker may also
agree to submit an existing controversy to arbitration. See Krause, Securities Litigation:The Unsolved
Problem of Predispute Arbitration Agreements for Pendent Claims, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 693, 694
(1980).
16. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
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usually involve interstate commerce, all securities claims are potentially
subject to the Act. 17
Congress has long favored arbitration as a method of dispute resolution. 18 As courts' dockets become more crowded, courts too have been
more open to arbitration as a method of dispute resolution. 19 Courts
liberally interpret the scope of an arbitration clause. 20 The Act, however,
limits a court's role to that of determining whether the party seeking
arbitration has raised an issue that is within the scope of the arbitration
agreement. 21 The policy favoring arbitration is so strong that the Supreme
22
Court held that a California statute prohibiting arbitration was invalid.
Thus, if a securities claim involving interstate commerce is brought under
the claim
state law alone and the investor signed an arbitration agreement,
23
cannot be heard in state court, but must be arbitrated.
B.

FederalSecurities Acts

In Wilko v. Swan,24 an investor sued his brokerage firm under section
12(2) of the Securities Act 25 for misrepresentations and omissions
17. Although an arbitration clause may state that it is governed by state law, it is settled that because
of the supremacy clause, the Act controls. See Georgia Power v. Cimarron Coal Corp., 526 F.2d 101,
107 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,425 U.S. 952 (1976).
18. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924).
19. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974); Stateside Mach. Co. v. Alperio, 591 F.2d 234, 240 (3d Cir. 1979).
20. Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585,598 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Gait v. Libbey-Owens Ford Glass
Co., 376 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1967).
21. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). The Act is limited by legal and equitable doctrines that permit revocation
of contracts. For example, when an allegation of fraud challenges the validity of the arbitration
agreement, the court may permit litigation of the dispute rather than submit it for arbitration. Moseley v.
Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S. 167 (1963) (prime contractor engaged in fraudulent
scheme by inserting arbitration clause into contract).
22. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1(1984) (California franchise investment statute, which
prohibited waiver of the right to litigate in state court, directly conflicted with the Federal Arbitration
Act in violation of the Supremacy Clause); accord, Garmo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 101 Wn. 2d
585, 681 P.2d 253 (1984) (Court adopted the analysis of Southland and concluded that Congress
enacted the Federal Arbitration Act to prevent state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of
arbitration agreements).
23. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
24. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
25. Section 12(2) of the Securities Act provides that:
Any person who offers or sells a security . . . by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the malls, by means of a prospectus
or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission),
and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing
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concerning the sale of stock. The Supreme Court held that the predispute
arbitration clause in the investor's brokerage agreement was void under the
Arbitration Act. 26 The Court concluded that an investor cannot waive the
right granted by the Securities Act to bring suit in federal court. 27
The Court relied on a number of factors in disallowing arbitration
agreements. First, it was concerned about inequality of bargaining power.
Since the Securities Act contains an express policy of protecting the
investor, 28 the Court concluded that section 12(2) was created to grant
investors a "special right" to litigate in federal court.29 The Court emphasized that a broker has the burden of proving lack of scienter under section
30
12(2). This burden might not be imposed by an arbitrator.
The Court also relied on the language of the Securities Act regarding
contrary stipulations. 3' Section 14 of the Securities Act provides: "Any
condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any
security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the
rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." ' 32 The Court
concluded that this language invalidated arbitration agreements regarding
federal securities claims. Finally, the Court was concerned about the ability
33
of arbitration to adequately deal with investor complaints.
Litigation in federal court under the securities acts has several advantages for the investor. First, the investor receives a wide choice of venue 34
and nationwide service of process. 35 Second, a court's reasoning will
usually be in writing. An arbitrator is not required to provide reasons for the
decision unless the parties to the arbitration so stipulate.36 Finally, a full
range of judicial review is available. An arbitrator's decision is subject to
limited judicial review. 37 After arbitration, only a "gross abuse of discretion" or a case of bias or corruption will receive judicial review. 38
such security from him ....
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
26. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
27.

Id.

28. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, Preamble, 48 Stat. 74.
29. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431. Section 12(2) does not state that investors have special rights and such
language is not found in the congressional history of § 12(2).
30. Id. at 436.
31. Id. at 434.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982). The language is substantially identical to that in the Exchange Act.
33. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436.
34. 28 U.S.C. 88 1391-1407 (1982).
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c), (d).
36. See Comment, supra note 1,at 129.
37. Sterk, supra note 11, at 483.
38. The Federal Arbitration Act specifies the following as permissible grounds for vacating an
arbitrator's award: (1) fraud, corruption, or undue means in procuring the award; (2) partiality or
corruption on the part of the arbitrator; (3) misconduct by the arbitrator in refusing to permit a
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The Wilko Court recognized that its holding was inconsistent with the
underlying policy of the Act. The Court must have reasoned, however, that
the protection of innocent, unknowledgeable investors was more important
than the economic advantage of arbitration.
C. Pre-Byrd Treatment of JointFederaland State Securities Claims
The courts prior to Byrd disagreed about how to resolve the problem that
occurred when investors sued brokers for both nonarbitrable federal claims
and arbitrable state claims. When both federal and state claims arose in the
same action, some courts severed the action, entertaining the federal claims
while referring the state claims to arbitration. 39 Other courts allowed
40
litigation of both the federal claim and the pendent state claim.
1.

FederalCourtLitigation of Both Claims: The IntertwiningDoctrine

Under the intertwining doctrine, federal courts could refuse to submit
state claims to arbitration when the facts that proved the state claims were
substantially the same as the facts that proved the federal claims. 41 The
intertwining doctrine is premised on two arguments. First, pendent state
and federal claims should be tried together to avoid possible collateral
estoppel effect of arbitration on the nonarbitrable claims. Collateral estoppel would threaten the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts over these
claims. 42 Second, to proceed with litigation in addition to arbitration is
inefficient and frustrates the Arbitration Act's purpose of fast and inexpen43
sive resolutions.
The Ninth Circuit adopted the intertwining doctrine in Byrd v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc.44 In Byrd, the plaintiff brought an action alleging
continuance of the hearing; (4)refusal by the arbitrator to hear pertinent evidence; and (5) action by the
arbitrator in excess of his power. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
Moreover, courts often apply collateral estoppel to decisions rendered in arbitration proceedings.
See, e.g., Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., FaD. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 92,200 (8th Cir.
June 25, 1985)(arbitrator's findings that no predicate acts supported federal racketeering violations
given collateral estoppel effect on federal court proceedings). Since collateral estoppel may allow the
investor only one opportunity to seek redress, it is vitally important that arbitration be made an adequate
method of dispute resolution.
39. See, e.g., Macchiavelli v. Shearson, Hamill & Co., 384 F Supp. 21, 30 (E.D. Cal. 1974).
40. See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 726 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S.
Ct. 1238 (1985).
42. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318,336 (5th Cir. 1981); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543
F2d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977).
43. Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 726 F2d 552 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1238
(1985); see also Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 585 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
44. 726 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985). The district courts in the Ninth

249

Washington Law Review

Vol. 61:245, 1986

state and federal securities law violations. The investor-broker contract
contained an arbitration agreement. 45 The broker moved to sever the
pendent state claims and arbitrate them after litigation of the federal claims.
The district court denied the motion. 46 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held
that, because the pendent state and federal claims depended on "substan47
tially the same factual issues," the claims should be litigated together.
The court emphasized that the federal and pendent state claims should not
be separated when the claims are so intertwined that the purposes of the
Arbitration Act 48 and the protective intent of the federal securities law
would be frustrated by separating the claims. 49 The Fifth and Eleventh
50
Circuits also adopted the intertwining doctrine.

Circuit were split on the issue of severance. Some district courts had adopted the bifurcated approach of
trying the federal claim and staying arbitration of the state claim, e.g., Roueche v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce
Fenner & Smith, 554 F. Supp. 338 (D. Hawaii 1983); other district courts had adopted the intertwining
doctrine, e.g., Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
45. A common arbitration agreement is as follows:
Any controversy between us arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof, shall be
settled by arbitration, in accordance with the rules, then obtaining, of either the Arbitration
Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of
, or the American Arbitration Association, or
the Board of Arbitration of the New York Stock Exchange, as customer may elect ....
8A C. NICHOLS, CYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL FORMS ANNOTATED § 8.5362, at 496 (1980).
46. Byrd, 726 F.2d at 553.
47. Id. at 554.
48. The Arbitration Act was designed to place arbitration agreements on the same footing as other
contracts, and to promote fast and inexpensive dispute resolution. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., Ist
Sess. 2 (1924).
49. 726 F.2d at 554.
50. The Ninth Circuit joined the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits when it adopted the intertwining
doctrine. In Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit held that the
state and federal claims were so intertwined that the claims should be litigated. The Miley court
reasoned that allowing an arbitrator to appraise the evidence and reach the primary conclusions on
issues central to the resolution of the case would present a threat of binding the federal forum through
collateral estoppel. Id. at 336-37. In Sawyer v. Raymond, James & Assocs., 642 F.2d 791 (5th Cir.
1981), the Fifth Circuit again upheld the intertwining doctrine. The court noted that factual severability
of disputed claims was of central importance in determining whether claims should be subject to
arbitration. Id. at 793.
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the intertwining doctrine in Raiford v. Buslease, Inc., 745 F.2d 1419
(I lth Cir. 1984). The Raiford court reasoned that all intertwining claims should be litigated because of
the threat of issue preclusion. Id. at 1423. The court emphasized that the possibility of preclusion might
have the effect ofencouraging parties to deliberately speed up or slow down one of the proceedings. The
three circuits that adopted the intertwining doctrine concluded that collateral estoppel was the overriding concern in separating substantially similar claims. These circuits were secondarily concerned with
the inefficiency of having two proceedings. This threat is probably more perceived than real, since a
court is not forced to give collateral estoppel effect to arbitration findings in subsequent litigation.
Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1984).
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2.

Rejection of the IntertwiningDoctrine

Other courts rejected the intertwining doctrine, holding that state claims
should be arbitrated. 5 1 These courts often stayed arbitration until the
securities claims were resolved. Conversely, some courts stayed litigation
pending arbitration. In favoring arbitration agreements, the courts stressed
that an individual's right to contract should be upheld and that efficiency
arguments were not sufficient to invalidate contractual provisions under the
Arbitration Act. 52 In rejecting the intertwining doctrine, these courts held
that the sequence of arbitration and litigation could be controlled to
53
preserve exclusive federal jurisdiction.
The Eighth Circuit rejected the intertwining doctrine in Surman v.
MerrillLynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith.54 In Surman, investors brought an
action alleging lOb-5 violations and common law fraud. The broker moved
to compel arbitration pursuant to various arbitration agreements. The court
rejected the intertwining doctrine and held that the state claims should be
arbitrated. 55 The court concluded that, by staying arbitration until judicial
resolution of the federal securities law claim, the court would not relinquish
56
its exclusive jurisdiction.
The Surman court cited the Ninth Circuit's decision in Byrd but expressly rejected its reasoning. 57 The court in Surman stated that neither the
collateral estoppel argument nor the efficiency argument was sufficient to
invalidate valid contractual provisions. 58 In rejecting the arguments advanced in favor of the intertwining doctrine, the Surman court relied on
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,59 in
which the Supreme Court reemphasized that the Arbitration Act is "a
congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration

51.

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.

52. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 1981) (arbitration
proceeding may be stayed pending litigation of federal securities claims); Applied Digital Technology,
Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116, 117 (7th Cir. 1978) (arbitration of fraud claim may be
stayed pending litigation of nonarbitrable antitrust claim).
54. 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1984).
55. Id. at 62.
56. Id. The court in Surman concluded that the concern over exclusive federal jurisdiction could be
eliminated by controlling the timing of court and arbitration proceedings. Id. at 63. Thus, if the court
stays the arbitration proceeding pending judicial resolution of the federal securities law claim, the court
would not relinquish its exclusive authority. Id. at 62-63.
57. Id. at 62.
58. Id.
59. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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agreements. " 60 In Moses, the Court acknowledged that "piecemeal resolution" may be necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement. 6 1 In
addition to the Eighth Circuit, the Sixth 62 and Seventh Circuits 63 rejected

the intertwining doctrine. Other circuits either had not addressed the
65
issue, 64 or addressed it only indirectly.

II.

DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC. v. BYRD

In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,66 the Supreme Court resolved the
conflicting approaches of the appellate courts. The Court held that a district
court must refer state claims to arbitration when they arejoined with federal
securities law claims. 67 The Court stated that neither a stay of arbitration
norjoint proceedings was necessary to protect federal jurisdiction. 68 Citing
the strong congressional desire to enforce contractual agreements between
parties, it reasoned that arbitration of state claims is necessary to ensure
that private agreements are judicially enforced. 69 In a footnote, the Court
observed that the Wilko doctrine might not apply to section 10(b) claims but
70
noted that the question was not before the Court.
In a concurring opinion, Justice White criticized the application of the
Wilko doctrine to section 10(b) claims. He explained that Wilko involved a
claim under section 12(2) of the Securities Act, which gives rise to a private
60. Id. at 24. Moses involved a suit to compel arbitration of a dispute under a construction contract.
The defendant opposed arbitration on the ground that only one of the two parties involved in the dispute
was bound by the contract providing for arbitration. The defendant faced the prospect of having to
resolve the dispute in two different forums. Nevertheless, the Court upheld arbitration.
61. Id. at 20.
62. Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983) (the plain language of the
Arbitration Act required courts to stay the litigation of arbitrable state claims and refer them to
arbitration). The Liskey court stated that much of the alleged inefficiency in bifurcated proceedings was
"speculative and could be eliminated" but did not suggest any methods by which this might be
accomplished. Id. at 320.
63. Dickinson v. Heinhold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981). The court refused to order
litigation of both federal and state claims. It emphasized that duplication of effort was not sufficient to
destroy the contractual right to arbitrate. Id. at 646. Furthermore, the Arbitration Act was specifically
aimed at the historical problem of courts refusing to honor contractual arbitration agreements. The
court feared that the intertwining doctrine would become the exception that swallowed the rule,
allowing otherwise arbitrable claims to be litigated. Id. at 645-46.
64. This author found no cases in the Third or Fourth Circuits concerning the intertwining doctrine.
65. N. Donald & Co. v. American United Energy Corp., 746 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1984) (arbitration
agreement between brokers). Since arbitration agreements are commonly enforced between brokers,
this case is not an indication of the Tenth Circuit's view of the intertwining doctrine. See also Lee v.
Ply*Gem Indus. Inc., 593 F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir.) (rejected intertwining doctrine where arbitrable state
claims joined with nonarbitrable federal antitrust claims), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).
66. 105 S.Ct. 1238 (1985).
67. Id. at 1244.
68. Id. at 1243.
69. Id. at 1242.
70. Id. at 1240 n.l.
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cause of action. 7' In contrast, section 10(b) of the Exchange Act does not
expressly provide a private cause of action. 72 Justice White found this
distinction significant because, he reasoned, the provision of the Exchange
Act which invalidates contrary stipulations does not apply to an implied
right of action. 73 Moreover, he explained, Wilko stressed the "special
rights" inherent in a section 12(2) action. A judicially implied cause of
action such as section 10(b), however, is not worthy of "special rights"
treatment. 74 Thus, Justice White would have ordered arbitration of both
claims in Byrd.

III.

ANALYSIS

The Byrd decision itself is unremarkable. Its significance lies in the
Court's and Justice White's discussions of the potential inapplicability of
Wilko to section 10(b) claims. The lower courts have consistently applied
the Wilko doctrine to section 10(b) claims, 75 allowing litigation of such
claims in federal court rather than referring them to arbitration. In view of
the Byrd Court's observation that the question is an open one, and considering the trend of the Supreme Court to limit the scope of the Securities
Acts, 76 the Court may eventually hold that Wilko does not apply to section
10(b) claims.
If the Court holds that Wilko does not apply to section 10(b) claims, an
anomalous situation would result. When section 12(2) claims are joined
with section 10(b) claims, the former would be litigated while the latter
would be arbitrated. This procedure would serve neither the goals of the
securities acts nor those of the Arbitration Act. A better solution is for
Congress or the Court to improve the arbitration process and then to allow
arbitration of all federal securities claims, whether brought under sections
10(b), 12(2), or any other section of either Act.

71. Id. at 1244 (White, J., concurring).
72. The Supreme Court implied a cause of action in 1I.. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
73. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring). Justice White's
distinction may be less significant in light of Eichler v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985) (Court did not
consider the distinction between implied right and express right of action in determining the availability
of the in pari delicto defense).
74. 105 S. Ct. 1244 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
75. See, e.g., Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824
(1977).
76. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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The Argument ForArbitration

Arbitration can have several advantages for investors if certain changes
are made in the arbitration process. If arbitration procedures are fair, and if
investors have adequate notice of the rights they are waiving by signing an
arbitration agreement, then investors should be held to that agreement.

1.

The ArbitrationProcess

The arbitration process is relatively simple. 77 First, the investor must
choose among the various self-regulatory associations that can arbitrate the

dispute. Next, the investor must file a claim letter with the associations'
director of arbitration setting forth the details of the dispute. The investor
must sign an agreement to submit the dispute to arbitration and remit a fee
for arbitration.
After the demand for arbitration is served on the opposing side, the

arbitrators must be appointed. The director of arbitration determines who
shall serve on the arbitration panel and names the chairperson of the
panel. 78 The investor has one peremptory challenge and an unlimited
79
number of challenges for cause.
The director decides where and when the hearing will be held, but the

investor may request a certain locale. 80 The arbitration proceeding itself is
conducted much like a trial, with an opening statement, presentation of the
case by an attorney or the investor, and closing statements. After the
arbitrators have reached their decision, copies of the award are mailed to the
81
parties.

77. See SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION
(1977) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM CODE], reprintedin NATIONAL ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, CODE OF
ARBITRATION PROCEDURE 4-14 (1984). The Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (S.I.C.A.)
has adopted the UNIFORM CODE. Katsoris, supra note 2, at 283-84. The S.I.C.A. consists of
representatives from various self-regulatory securities organizations, a securities industry trade association, and the public. During 1979 and 1980, the UNIFORM CODE was adopted by the American,
Boston, Cincinnati, Midwest, New York, Pacific, and Philadelphia Stock Exchanges, the Chicago
Board of Options Exchange, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, and the National Association
of Securities Dealers. Katsoris, supra note 2, at 283. The investor who arbitrates must choose among
several forums established by the self-regulated securities associations, such as the National Association of Securities Dealers. Fees for arbitration range from $15 for a claim of $1000 or less, to $750 for a
claim exceeding $100,000.
78. UNIFORM CODE, supra note 77, at § 20.
79. Id. § 22.
80. Id. § 26.
81. Id. § 41.
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2.

Advantages ofArbitrationfor the Investor

The significant advantage of arbitration for the investor is that it is a
relatively inexpensive and speedy process. 82 Securities investors need a
forum in which disputes can be resolved quickly because delay in adequate
resolution can result in exposure to market risk. 83 Moreover, because
arbitration is less formal and complex than court proceedings, investors can
more easily represent themselves. The discovery process in arbitration is
also less involved. Investors may obtain information without the formalities
of depositions and interrogatories.
As long as arbitration is fair, and investors have notice of which rights
they are waiving when they sign an arbitration agreement, there is no
reason to ignore a contractual arrangement to arbitrate. Because substantive rights could be lost or unknowingly waived, however, some commentators have questioned the desirability of arbitration as a forum for resolving
securities fraud disputes. 84 There are plausible arguments in favor of
litigating federal claims, but arbitration, once modified, can answer the
concerns raised in these arguments.
Courts and commentators have expressed four main concerns with the
present arbitration system. First, the investor gives up the right to a jury
trial by submitting claims to arbitration. 85 If, however, the investor knows
and understands the implications of waiving the right to a jury trial, and if
the arbitration election is optional, the broker's contractual right should be
recognized and the claims arbitrated.
The second area involves procedural concerns. An investor receives the
benefits of nationwide service of process by litigating in federal court; the
investor can serve the broker anywhere. 86 The investor does not lose this
advantage, however, in bringing an arbitration action. All the investor need
do is file a claim with the director of arbitration and it is sent to the opposing
party. 87 In federal court, a particular venue is usually selected because it is
more convenient for one of the parties. In an arbitration proceeding, while
the investor may request a certain locale, the director of arbitration determines the location of the hearing. This area of arbitration could be improved by providing guidelines for choosing the location of arbitration, or
82. See supra note 11.
83. Krause, supra note 15, at 721. An investor's securities portfolio can decline substantially in
value if the market turns downward between the time that the claim arose and resolution of that claim.
84. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 1, at 129-33.
85. The right to a jury trial in federal court is provided in the seventh amendment. U.S. CONST.
amend. Vn. Thus, when securities claims are litigated in federal court, the investor has the right to
request a jury trial.
86. See supra note 35.
87. See UwinoRm CODE, supra note 77, at § 25. The opposing party has 20 business days to
provide an answer.
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by requiring that the proceedings be held in the city closest to the investor's
88
residence.
Third, securities claims have been compared to antitrust claims; it has
been argued that since antitrust claims cannot be arbitrated, securities
claims should not be arbitrated. 89 The policy of resolving antitrust issues in
the public forum, however, may not apply to investor-broker disputes. 9°
Finally, a major complaint against arbitration is lack of adequate discovery. The Uniform Code of Arbitration 9' provides for a subpoena process if
the parties are unable to obtain access to witnesses or documents. 92 Arbitration is faster and less expensive than litigation, in part because discovery is limited. If the full range of discovery rights available under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were allowed in arbitration, the process
would take longer and be more expensive to investors. 93 Rather than
increasing the time and expense of arbitration, the limited discovery
available in arbitration should be clarified so that investors can obtain
adequate information to present their claims.
B.

A New Rule Allowing Arbitrationof FederalSecurities Claims

Arbitration proceedings can be beneficial to investors, provided investors have adequate notice of the rights that they are waiving. Nevertheless,
arbitration of federal claims conflicts with the language of the Securities
Act 94 as interpreted in Wilko. 95 The Wilko Court had three reasons for
holding that federal securities claims are nonarbitrable. First, the Court was
concerned about inequality of bargaining power and stressed that the
96
Securities Act contains an express policy of protecting the investor.
Second, the Court relied on the language from the Securities Acts prohibiting contrary stipulations. 97 Third, the Court expressed reservations about
the adequacy of arbitration because the investor loses the advantages of
88. See supra text accompanying note 80.
89. See, e.g., Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 436 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1970).
90. One policy for not allowing arbitration of antitrust claims is that the complex legal and factual
issues are more appropriate for judicial consideration. Allegaert, 548 F.2d at 437. However, most
investor disputes involve section lOb-5 claims, which present issues substantially similar to common
law fraud and are not typically factually complex. Krause, supra note 15, at 707.
91. See UNIFORM CODE, supra note 77.
92. Id. § 32.
93. Neville, The Enforcement ofArbitrationClauses in lnvestor-BrokerAgreements, 34 ARB. J. 5,
10-11 (1979).
94. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 24-33.
96. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430-31.
97. Id. at 435.
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litigation in federal court. 98 The Court suggested that when arbitration
agreements are signed, the investor may be unable to "judge the weight of
the handicap the Securities Act places upon his adversary. " 99 The Wilko
doctrine might be changed by congressional action. Any change, however,
should address the concerns raised by the Wilko Court.
1.

CongressionalAction: Changing the Wilko Doctrine

Congress could amend the securities acts to allow for arbitration agreements. This could best be done by adding a clause of exception to the
section prohibiting contrary stipulations. 100 To address the Wilko Court's
concerns about inequality of bargaining power and investor protection, ' 0 '
Congress could require that arbitration clauses be "clear and conspicuous"
in warning that the investor is surrendering certain rights, specifically, the

right to a jury trial in federal court.
Once Congress has amended the securities acts to allow arbitration, the
SEC should promulgate rules requiring that conspicuous legends and
warnings be placed on arbitration agreements. 102 Such regulations might
98. Id. Two disadvantages discussed by the Court were that arbitrators are allowed to make
judgments without explaining their reasoning or providing a record of the proceeding and that the
judicial power to vacate an award is limited. Id. at 435-37.
99. Id. at 435.
100. Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act provides an example of the nonwaiver provisions: "Any
condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with
any provision of this title or of the rules and regulations or commission shall be void." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78cc(a) (1982).
An example of a clause of exception is: "Except that this provision shall not apply to qualified
arbitration agreements." Qualified arbitration agreements should be defined as those agreements
complying with relevant SEC rules and association guidelines.
101. This inequality of bargaining power stems from the fact that securities sellers regularly enter
into securities agreements, whereas buyers less frequently engage in securities transactions and hence
may not be aware of or understand the implications of the arbitration clause.
102. The SEC has been critical of arbitration agreements forced upon customers without adequate
disclosure of the investor's rights. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, [1979 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,122, 81,976-78 (July 2, 1979). The SEC was concerned that investors
may be unaware of theirright to litigate their federal securities claims in federal court. Id. at 81,975.
Because of that concern, the SEC stated that brokers should include information in arbitration clauses
concerning investors' rights to a federal forum, so that such clauses are not misleading. Id.
After the SEC voiced its concern about arbitration clauses, the S.I.C.A. added the following
introductory statement to its booklet for investors involved in arbitration:
The Supreme Court, in the case of Wilco [sic] vs. Swan, . . .and other federal courts have held
that a customer of a broker-dealer could not be compelled to arbitrate a claim arising under certain
federal securities acts, even though the customer had signed an agreement with the broker-dealer
to arbitrate future controversies. If you have signed such a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, you
may wish to consult with counsel before proceeding with arbitration.
SEcutrrss INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION,

ARBITRATION PROCEDURES (inside front cover)
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require that the warning be in boldface type, analogous to the conspicuous
language requirement in a products liability statute for warranty disclaimers. 103 The SEC might also require that a specific legend must appear
in all such agreements. This could be similar to the legends required in
certain prospectuses under the Securities Act of 1933.104 Finally, the
regulations could require that the arbitration agreement be on separate
paper so that the investor's attention is adequately drawn to the rights
surrendered. Following promulgation of these rules, the various securities
regulatory organizations, such as the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD), could communicate the regulations to brokers and deal05
ers and urge compliance with those regulations. 1
2.

JudicialAction

Congressional amendment of the securities acts to allow arbitration is
preferable to judicial modification of the Wilko doctrine because Congress
can best require compliance with detailed disclosure rules. Despite repeated calls for reform, 106 Congress has been slow to amend the fifty-yearold securities acts. Consequently, the judiciary might modify the Wilko
(1984). The SEC and the S.I.C.A. have sought to make arbitration provisions more fair. The selfregulated securities industry, however, has the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that investors are
aware of their rights under arbitration agreements. See also Katsoris, supra note 2, at 296.
In order to further spur brokers toward making arbitration agreement disclosures, the SEC adopted
Rule 15c2-2 in 1983. 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 26,916, at 20,173-2 (1983). Rule 15c2-2 provides, in
part: "It shall be a fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act or practice for a broker or dealer to enter
into an agreement with any public customer which purports to bind the customer to the arbitration of
future disputes between them arising under the Federal securities laws ....
".17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c2-2(a) (1985).
If the forum for resolution of investor disputes is moved from the courts to the self-regulatory
associations, the SEC must continue to oversee closely the activities of such associations. In turn, the
self-regulatory organizations must maintain high standards in policing members.
103. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-316 (1977).
104. See, Regulation D, 12 C.F.R. § 230.502 (D)(d)(3)(1985).
105. There are two main sections of the Exchange Act that regulate the registration of securities
exchanges and national associations. Section 6(b) of the Exchange Act authorizes exchanges to register
as self-regulatory entities and requires that exchanges promulgate rules promoting "just and equitable
principles of trade" and provide for discipline of members engaging in "fraudulent and manipulative
acts and practices." 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1982). Section 15A(b)(8) of the Exchange Act provides for
the establishment of national securities associations to supervise the securities markets. In order for a
group of brokers and dealers to form an association, the group must file an application for registration
with the SEC that contains the rules of the association. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(a)(1982).
The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) filed its registration statement with the SEC
on July 20, 1939. NATIONAL Ass'N OF SEC. DEALERS, REPRINT OF THE NASD MANUAL 109-10 (1985).

The NASD Board of Governors determines policy and sets up committees to study problems and
suggest actions t9 be taken. The SEC can review any disciplinary action imposed by a broker-dealer
association, promulgate superseding regulations or revoke any association's registration if the association does not enforce compliance with its own rules. See 15 U.S.C. 88 78s(c), (d) (1982).
106. Krause, supra note 15, at 720.

258

Arbitration of Federal Securities Claims
doctrine without congressional action. Again, any judicial modification to
allow for arbitration of federal claims must address the Wilko Court's
concerns.
Courts could address the concern of inequality of bargaining power by
requiring proof that an arbitration agreement was freely negotiated before
giving effect to the agreement. Once courts are convinced that arbitration
provisions are freely agreed to by informed investors, the gap in bargaining
power between investors and brokers would be greatly narrowed. The
courts could then interpret arbitration provisions as fair agreements, rather
than as waivers of important substantive rights. With respect to investor
protection, the courts could inquire into other grounds of invalidating
arbitration agreements, such as unconscionability. 10 7 These claims would
fall under the provision for revocation of arbitration agreements as set forth

in the Act. 108
The Wilko Court argued that the provisions of the 1933 Act cannot be
waived by contrary stipulations. 109 In order to circumvent this provision for
section 12(2) claims, the Court would have to overrule Wilko and hold that
in the contrary stipulations section, Congress intended only to include such
contrary stipulations as one stating that the purchaser is a knowledgeable
investor and will not hold the seller liable for misrepresentations. With
regard to section 10(b) claims, the Court could hold, as Justice White
argued in Byrd, that the contrary stipulations section may have no meaning
with respect to implied rights of action under section 10(b). 110 The Exchange Act does, however, provide for exclusive jurisdiction in federal
court.111 Thus, the Court would have to resolve this issue in overruling
Wilko. Since the Securities Act provides for concurrent jurisdiction 1 2 in
state and federal courts, exclusive jurisdiction is not a problem with respect
to 12(2) claims.
3.

Industry Improvements in SecuritiesArbitration

Additional concerns of the Wilko Court were the competency of arbitrators and the fairness of the proceedings. 113 Major improvements must
107. See, e.g., Pierson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Fm. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,615 (7th Cir.
Aug. 6, 1984) (plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that arbitration clause was unconscionable as a contract
of adhesion).

108.

See supra note 16.

109. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
110. 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring). The exclusive jurisdiction provision of the 1934 Act
also may not apply to jurisdiction over implied causes of action. Id.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 77v.
113. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
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be made in the arbitration process in order to answer these concerns. These
are changes that the Court could only suggest, but could not implement.
The SEC and the industry itself must implement these changes.
Arbitration of both federal and state claims, although arguably preferred, presents some disadvantages for the investor. There are two key
areas of arbitration proceedings that require improvement. First, as discussed earlier, investors who arbitrate surrender important discovery
rights. Investors may be unable to learn about the number of commissions
generated by their account or the nature of recommendations made by the
4 The regulatory associations should
broker. 11
ensure that the discovery
process is sufficient for investors to present their claims.
Another area that needs improvement is investor perception of the
fairness of the arbitration process. It is important to create investor confidence in arbitration. This confidence will come from demonstrating that
arbitration procedures are fair. 115 One obvious barrier to confidence in
arbitration is the common requirement that investors submit disputes to
arbitrators who are selected by the self-regulated securities industry. 116
Unless a public customer elects otherwise, the majority of the arbitration
panel will be persons from outside the securities industry. " 7 These outside
individuals, however, are often attorneys who represent brokers. Investors
might have more confidence in the fairness of arbitration procedures if the
arbitration panel had representation from other professions.
Fairness would also be enhanced if arbitrators were required to state
reasons with their awards. Without published findings of fact, arbitration
will continue to be criticized as a haphazard process. With publication of
reasons, parties would have access to a body of arbitral law and thus know
better what to expect from arbitration.
If Congress amends the securities acts to allow arbitration, or in the
alternative, if the Court overrules Wilko to allow arbitration of all securities
claims, the SEC should promulgate rules that ensure fair arbitration proceedings. The NASD and other regulatory associations should then issue
guidelines to member broker-dealers regarding the use of arbitration
clauses. These guidelines should set forth sanctions for noncompliance
including the discipline of brokers and the revocation of licenses.

114.
115.
116.
117.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, the Supreme Court hinted that
section 10(b) claims may not be subject to the Wilko nonarbitration doctrine. This leaves open the possibility that at least some federal claims may
be arbitrated in the future. While Congress might amend the securities acts
to allow arbitration of federal claims, such action is not imminent. The
Supreme Court clearly has the power and the opportunity to overrule Wilko.
It should refrain from doing so, however, until the arbitration process has
been substantially improved. To that end, the securities industry must take
its mandate of self-regulation seriously and work to make arbitration
proceedings more consistent with the policy of investor protection.
Sherrie Kaiser Goff

